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Abstract
In ‘How Many Lives has Schrödinger’s Cat?’ David Lewis argues that the Everettian 
no-collapse interpretation of quantum mechanics is in a tangle when it comes to 
probabilities.  This paper aims to show that the difficulties that Lewis raises are 
insubstantial.  The Everettian metaphysics contains a coherent account of probability.  
Indeed it accounts for probability rather better than orthodox metaphysics does.
1.  Introduction
On 27 June 2001, not four months before his untimely death, David Lewis delivered 
the third Jack Smart Lecture at the Australian National University.  His title was 
‘How Many Lives has Schrödinger’s Cat?’1[1] and he spoke on a topic which is absent 
from his published writings, the interpretation of quantum mechanics.  More 
specifically, he discussed the ‘no-collapse’ interpretation of quantum mechanics 
pioneered by Hugh Everett III [1957].  Lewis allowed that this interpretation offers 
initial theoretical attractions, but also argued that it suffers from irremediable flaws.
If you have heard of Everett because of his association with the ‘many-worlds’ 
interpretation of quantum mechanics popularised by Bryce Dewitt [1970, 1972], you 
might suppose that there is some affinity between the no-collapse interpretation and 
Lewis’s philosophical realism about possible worlds.  But this would be a mistake.  
While Everett’s interpretation does add extra ‘branches’ to the reality recognized by 
common sense, these additions fall far short of Lewis’s multiplication of worlds.  For 
a start, the extra ‘branches’ that Everett adds to reality all lie within the actual world 
that evolves from the actual initial conditions in line with the actual laws of physics—
these branches by no means include all possibilities.  Moreover, Everett’s branches 
are best conceived, not as sunderings of the whole universe, but rather as entities that 
spread out causally at finite speeds, ‘like ripples on a pond’, as Lewis puts it.  For 
example, in the Schrödinger’s Cat experiment, first the photon branches into a 
deflected and undeflected version when it passes through the half-slivered mirror;  
then the detector branches into a triggered and untriggered state when it interacts with 
the photon;  then the poison bottle branches into a smashed bottle and an unsmashed 
bottle under the influence of the detector;  and so on, culminating in the cat branching 
into a live and dead cat, and the human observer branching into a self who sees a live 
cat and a self who sees a dead cat.2[2]
                                                
1[1]  The lecture is reprinted on pp. 00-00 of this volume.
2[2]  ‘Many-worlds’ is thus not an apt name for the optimal Everettian view, as Lewis observes (p. 00).  
Following Lewis’s lead, I shall stick to the simple ‘no-collapse interpretation’.  (I used to favour the
terminology of ‘many minds’ as a way of conveying the local nature of Everettian splitting [Papineau 
1995; 1997] but I now think that this suggests an overly subjective reading of Everett.) 
It is precisely this causal proliferation of branches that makes the no-collapse 
interpretation so theoretically attractive.  Basic quantum mechanics leaves us with no 
alternative but to allow that microscopic entities can be in superpositions of different 
observable values—for example, in the double-slit experiment we need to allow that 
the electron’s state prior to observation contains branches corresponding to its passage 
through each of the slits, otherwise we will not be able to explain the observed 
interference effects.  However, this means that orthodox quantum mechanics has great 
difficulty in accounting for the apparent definiteness of the macroscopic world.  For 
the central quantum mechanical law of motion, Schrödinger’s equation, indicates that 
macroscopic systems which interact with other superposed systems will themselves 
enter into superpositions, just as in the Everettian reading of the Schrödinger’s Cat 
experiment outlined above.  So, in order for orthodox interpretations of quantum 
mechanics to stop this disturbing proliferation of macroscopic branches, they must 
add something to Schrödinger’s equation—and they add ‘collapses’.  At some point 
reality ‘collapses’ unpredictably into just one element of the proliferating network of 
superpositions.  The trouble facing such orthodox collapse interpretations, however, is 
that all explicit theories about ‘collapses’ seem arbitrary and ad hoc (not to mention 
their inconsistency with special relativity and with the conservation of energy).  This 
is where Everett has an advantage.  It simply embraces the deterministic Schrödinger 
evolution of causally proliferating superpositions, and denies that reality ever collapes 
into just one branch.  By thus rejecting collapses, Everett thus promises to remove ‘a 
gratuitous blotch on an otherwise elegant theory’, as Lewis puts it.
The challenge facing the Everett interpretation is to explain how we human beings fit 
into this strange world of proliferating branches.  This is not just a matter of 
anthropocentric self-absorption.  For unless we can show how the no-collapse 
interpretation saves the appearances—that is, how it predicts what we experience—
we will have no reason to believe it in the first place.  
Following Lewis, we can divide this challenge into two parts.  The first is to explain 
why our experience should always present the world as definite, when in fact it is in a 
superposition.  The second is to explain in what sense the no-collapse interpretation 
can predict that some braches are more probable than others, given that it also says 
that all branches will definitely occur.  
On the first issue, Lewis concedes there is no difficulty.  He offers the model of a 
duplicating beamer-upper that gives you two successors, one on the starship 
Enterprise and another on the starship Ptomekin.  These successors will each have 
their own experiences, and before you are beamed up you can anticipate becoming 
both successors (though not becoming one successor who has both sets of 
experiences).  The same will occur when you ‘branch’ after interacting with a 
quantum system that is in a superposition of two definite observable values.  After the 
interaction, you will have two successors, one of whom observes one value and 
another of whom observes the other value—and before the interaction you can 
anticipate becoming both successors (though not becoming one successor who has 
both sets of experiences).
It is the second issue, to do with probabilities, that Lewis takes to pose problems for 
Everett.  The main body of Lewis’s paper, after his elegant and illuminating 
explanation of the above issues, is concerned to show that Everettians are in a tangle 
when it comes to probabilities.  Not that Lewis aims to present a knock-down 
argument against the no-collapse view.  Rather he makes two points.  First, he 
maintains that Everettians have no good way of justifying the ‘intensity rule’ which is 
their only alternative to orthodox probabilistic thinking.  Second, he argues that 
Everettians are forced to discount the possibility of death in life-or-death situations, 
and that this has unpalatable consequences.
As I said, Lewis does not present any of this as conclusively discrediting the no-
collapse interpretation.  But he clearly takes it to tip the balance against Everett.  Thus 
he mentions in section 2 that his own marked preference is for a collapse theory along 
the lines of the ‘GRW hypothesis’ (while simultaneously admitting that his readiness 
to countenance collapses may be due to his having a scientific background in 
chemistry rather than mathematical physics) [Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber 1986].
I what follows I shall try to show that the difficulties that Lewis raises for Everett are 
insubstantial.  The picture of reality offered by the no-collapse interpretation is 
certainly weird and wonderful.  But it is quite cogent, and in particular it contains a 
coherent account of probability.  If worries about probability are the main reason for 
dismissing Everett and continuing to put up with collapses, then maybe we should 
think again.  If you ask me, even chemists have reason to take Everett seriously.
The rest of this paper contains two sections.  The next section discusses the Everettian 
‘intensity rule’.  The final section considers whether Everett has unpalatable 
implications for life-and-death situations. 
2.  The Intensity Rule
2a.  Chances and Intensities
Orthodox collapse interpretations of quantum mechanics ascribe chances to the 
various possible outcomes of a collapse, corresponding to the pre-collapse squared 
amplitudes of the branches that will yield these outcomes.  Only one of the alternative 
outcomes will become real.  The chance of an outcome can be thought of as 
signifying its current standing in the competition to become real.  Sometimes 
outcomes with low chances will become real, but the odds are in favour of outcomes 
with high chances.
The no-collapse interpretation has no room for chances, so conceived.  For it denies 
that only one of the alternative outcomes will occur.  From the Everettian point of 
view there is no competition to become real.  All the alternatives are determined to 
happen.  This makes it hard to see how any of them can have a chance different from 
one.
Lewis points out that without chances the no-collapse interpretation is in danger of 
sawing off the branch that it is sitting on.  After all, the only reason for believing 
quantum mechanics in the first place, as with any theory, is that the world we observe 
matches the world that the theory advises us to expect.  But the expectations advised 
by an indeterministic theory like quantum mechanics derive from the chances it 
implies.  Any indeterministic theory tells us to expect outcomes in proportion to its 
chances, and is then confirmed to the extent that it urges high expectations for what is 
actually observed.  However, if the no-collapse interpretation eschews chances, on the 
grounds that all alternative outcomes will occur, then it would seem unable to advise 
us to expect different outcomes to different degrees, and so unable to maintain that 
quantum mechanics is confirmed by what is actually observed.
Lewis allows that Everettians might respond by adopting an ‘intensity rule’ to govern 
their expectations.  Suppose that Everettians think of their non-collapsing branches as 
having differering ‘intensities’, corresponding to the squared amplitudes of those 
branches.  Then they can proportion their expectations about the future directly to 
these intensities, even in the absence of any chances.  For example, in the case of 
Schrödinger’s cat, if the squared amplitude of the branch where the cat is alive is 50%, 
and that of the branch where it is dead is 50%, then you should expect to see the cat 
alive to degree 50%, and expect to see it dead to degree 50%.  The intensity rule thus 
offers Everettians an alternative route to the confirmation of quantum mechanics.  If 
you proportion your expectations directly to the squared amplitudes, in line with the 
intensity rule, then once more you can regard quantum mechanics as confirmed if the 
outcomes you observe are the ones that you expected.3[3]
Lewis’s central worry about the intensity rule is that there is no good way to justify it.  
Everettians have no option but to accept it as a primitive truth about rationality.
Still, as Lewis himself immediately asks ‘How bad is that?’  After all, orthodox 
metaphysics itself adopts an analogous ‘chance rule’, advising minds to proportion 
their expectations to the chances.  In particular, orthodox interpretations of quantum 
mechanics presume just this rule when they advise expectations about the outcomes of 
collapses.  Yet, as Lewis admits, there is no good way of justifying the chance rule 
either.
This suggests that Everett is here on the same footing as orthodoxy.  Everett needs the 
intensity rule.  Orthodoxy needs the chance rule.  Neither can be justified.
In fact I think the situation is even more favourable to the no-collapse view than this.  
When it comes to the justification of rules telling us how to proportion expectations to 
the objective facts, not only is the no-collapse view no worse off that orthodoxy (as I 
shall argue in section 2b)—it is positively better off.  Indeed it is better off twice over.  
First, orthodoxy faces an extra issue of justification, which does not arise on the no-
collapse perspective (section 2c below).  Second, the no-collapse perspective 
promises to ground the intensity rule in physical symmetries, in ways not obviously 
available to orthodoxy (section 2d).
                                                
3[3]  The no-collapse interpretation implies that, in addition to those (high intensity) later selves who 
observe frequencies that confirm quantum mechanics, you will also have (low intensity) later selves 
who observe rogue frequencies that disconfirm quantum mechanics.  This might seem worrying, but it 
is not clear that the no-collapse view has any more trouble with knowledge of quantum-mechanical 
amplitudes than does orthodoxy.  On any account of statistical inference, there is always a danger of 
observing an improbable frequency in repeated trials.  Even so, orthodoxy takes observed frequencies 
to be evidence for corresponding chances (and hence quantum mechanical amplitudes).  Everettians 
can advise us to reason in just the standard way, modulo the substitution of intensities for chances:  
infer that the intensity (and hence quantum mechanical amplitude) is close to the observed frequency, 
and hope that you are not the victim of an unlucky sample.
By contrast, Lewis thinks that the intensity rule is more problematic than the chance 
rule.  We can introduce each of the next three sections with arguments he offers, all 
alas frustratingly brief.
2b.  Two Mysteries or One?  Lewis’s first argument is that the no-collapse 
interpretation will be stuck with two mysteries, where orthodoxy will have only one:  
Everett will need both the unjustifiable chance rule and the unjustifiable intensity rule, 
whereas orthodoxy needs only the chance rule.  However, Lewis’s argument for this 
claim is rather puzzling.  He says the two rules ‘are not at all the same sort of thing’, 
observing that the chance rule is concerned with alternative possibilities, whereas the 
intensity rule deals with co-existing actualities.  In consequence, says Lewis, the 
expectations governed by the intensity rule are not the same as the subjective 
probabilities dictated by the chance rule, nor are intensities the same as chances.  
Subjective probabilities and chances pertain to alternative possibilities, not co-existing 
actualities.
Maybe so, but I don’t see why this shows that Everettians need two rules rather than 
one.  Suppose I agree that the intensity and chance rules ‘are not at all the same sort of 
thing’.  This doesn’t show that I have to adopt both, if I adopt the intensity rule.  Why 
can’t I adopt the intensity rule and drop the chance rule?  And this is surely what any 
sensible Everettian will do, if persuaded by Lewis that the two rules are so very 
different.  Instead of adopting the intensity rule as an addition to the chance rule, 
Everettians will simply replace the chance rule by the intensity rule.
Of course, this strategy will only make sense if the situations where the chance rule is 
needed are all quantum mechanical.  For the intensity rule is explicitly tailored to 
quantum mechanical intensities, and so will only be able to replace the chance rule in 
set-ups where such intensities are available.  If chances are sometimes present in non-
quantum mechanical situations, then there won’t be any intensities to govern 
Everettian expectations, and in these cases Everettians will need the chance rule in 
addition to the intensity rule.  (For example, you might think that the toss of an 
ordinary coin involves chances but no quantum mechanics.)
Still, it seems perfectly plausible that all seriously chancy situations do in fact have a 
quantum-mechanical basis.  In support of this, consider Lewis’s own comments in 
section 5 of his paper, when he argues that all death-mechanisms are quantum-
mechanical.  At first sight it may seem that deaths due to poisoning, say, or shooting, 
or auto-immune disease, owe nothing to quantum mechanics.  But Lewis argues 
convincingly that all biochemical and mechanical processes are subject to quantum 
mechanical unpredictability.  In line with this, it seems open to Everettians to hold 
that any serious statistics displayed by such processes are reflections of underlying 
quantum mechanical intensities.  Again, in previous work Lewis has argued that even 
ordinary coin tosses might be viewed as quantum-mechanical processes, which once 
more suggests that Everettians will be able to apply the intensity rule [1986: 118-19].  
In general, then, it seems open to Everettians to argue that quantum-mechanical 
intensities will be available in all situations where orthodox thinking demands that 
expectations are tailored to chances.
So far I have assumed that someone who adopts the intensity rule as the sole principle 
governing expectations will therewith reject the chance rule.  This is in line with 
Lewis’s claim that the two rules are ‘not at all the same kind of thing’.  However, this 
elimination of the chance rule is not the only option available to Everettians.  An 
alternative is to argue that the intensity rule reduces the chance rule, by showing us 
more clearly the real nature of chances.  According to this reductionist option, 
orthodox thinking is right to hold that expectations should reflect chances, but wrong 
to assume that chances are measures over competing possibilities:  in truth, chances 
always were measures over co-existing branches of reality, and the intensity rule is 
nothing other than the chance rule stripped of outmoded metaphysics.
I do not take this choice between elimination and reduction to be a substantial issue.  
As with most such choices, there is no reason to suppose that the prior meaning of the 
crucial term (‘chance’) is definite enough to decide the issue [cf. Papineau 1996].  Is it 
part of the definition of ‘chance’ that it is a measure over competing possibilities (in 
which case Everettians must say there are no chances)?  Or does the definition of 
‘chance’ specify only that chance is that magnitude which expectations should reflect 
(in which case Everettians can equate chances with intensities)?  Since nobody ever 
thought to stipulate an answer beforehand, it seems to me a matter of choice how we 
sharpen the term ‘chance’ now that the question has arisen.  
For my money, it is a polemically better strategy for Everettians to say they are 
keeping chances, but thinking of them rather differently.4[4]  But I do not propose to 
press the point here.  As I said, it is not a substantial issue.  Either way, the 
Everettians will end up with one primitive rule governing expectations, and to this 
extent will be on a par with orthodoxy.  Polemics aside, it doesn’t matter whether they 
say it is a refinement of the old chance rule, or a replacement for it.
Still, it will be helpful to define our terms, and for the purposes of the subsequent 
discussion I am happy to understand ‘chance’ as Lewis does, tying it to an orthodox 
metaphysics of competing possibilities.  I shall use ‘intensity’ for the Everettian 
measure over coexisting branches.   When I want a term for objective single-case 
probability that is neutral between the two notions, I shall simply employ ‘probability’.
2c. Caring for Future Selves  Lewis thinks there is another reason why the lack of 
justification counts against the intensity rule more than the chance rule.  ‘Not only do 
we have no way to justify the intensity rule;  we have a plausible way to justify a 
conflicting rule.  All your future selves, on all your branches, are equally real, and 
equally yours.  You will have experiences of all of them.  Do they not deserve equal 
weight . . . regardless of their intensities?’ (p. 00). 
At first sight Lewis may seem to have a point here.  The no-collapse intensity rule 
does not treat all future selves equitably, despite the full-blooded actuality of these 
multiple selves.  However, it would be too quick to assume that this counts in favour 
of orthodoxy and against Everett.  For orthodoxy can also be accused of inequitable 
                                                
4[4]  In another context, Lewis himself makes a similar move.  At the end of his ‘Humean 
Supervenience Debugged’ [1994], he observes that the kind of chances defended in that paper only 
imperfectly satisfy the role that defines ‘chance’.  He says:  ‘. . . nothing perfectly occupies the role, so 
nothing perfectly deserves the name.  But near enough is good enough. . . .   an imperfect candidate 
may deserve the name quite well enough’ (p. 489).  (I offer reasons for thinking that Everettian 
intensities are indeed ‘near enough’ to ordinary chances in [Papineau 1995].)
bias in its treatment of future selves.  What is more, orthodoxy’s bias turns out to be 
in tension with its underlying metaphysics, in a way that the Everettian bias isn’t.  So 
in the end it is orthodoxy, not Everett, that has more trouble with the biased treatment 
of future selves.  
Let me go more slowly.  First consider Everett’s treatment of future selves.  By 
setting expectations equal to the intensity of the branches, Everett does indeed favour 
some successors over others.  To see this, consider choices between actions that 
benefit your successors differentially.  Insofar as you conform to the intensity rule, 
you will favour those actions that benefit your high-intensity successors over those 
that benefit your low-intensity successors.5[5]
Still, does orthodoxy make uncertain choices any less discriminatory?  According to 
orthodox metaphysics, in any chancy situation I will have a number of possible
successors.  Yet these successors do not weigh equally in orthodox choices either, 
since the chance rule analogously advises me to choose those actions that benefit my 
high-chance possible successors over those that benefit my low-chance possible 
successors.
You might feel inclined to respond that the two cases are different.  On the orthodox 
view, only one of your possible successors will become actual, not all of them, and 
only this successor really matters.  By contrast, on the no-collapse view all your 
possible successors will become actual, and so are all worth caring about.  True 
enough.  But this difference, far from helping orthodoxy, turns out to cause it extra 
problems.  Think of it like this.  Both orthodoxy and Everett advise acting with the 
probabilities, in the sense of favouring high-probability possible successors over low-
probability ones.  And both take this to be a primitive principle of rationality, since 
neither can justify it in terms of something more basic.  But is it much odder for 
orthodoxy to take this principle as primitive than Everett, since orthodoxy doesn’t 
care about all possible successors, in the way that Everett does.  Orthodoxy thinks that 
only the one actual successor matters.  So, even after primitively committing itself to 
acting with the probabilities, orthodoxy would seem to face an extra question, which 
doesn’t arise for Everett, of explaining why this commitment is good for the sole 
actual successor who matters.
To see the point, note that we normally take the aim of an uncertain choice to be 
benefit to the sole actual successor.  Yet in practice I choose that action that 
maximizes benefit over all possible successors weighted by their chances.  This action 
won’t necessarily benefit my actual successor (odds-on favourites can lose, and long 
shots can come home).  So there is room to ask orthodoxy:  why is it such a good idea 
to opt for the action that maximizes chance-weighted benefit over all possible 
successors, given that what I really want is benefit to my sole actual successor?
You might think that orthodoxy can justify maximizing chance-weighted benefit on 
the grounds that this ensures your actual successors will do well in the long run.  But 
there is no guarantee that betting with the chances will win in the long run either.  I 
can be unlucky in the long run as well as the short.  Perhaps, if you are prepared to 
                                                
5[5] Doesn’t this last claim presuppose that choices will maximize expected benefit?  Yes, but this is no 
new assumption.  It is already built into the notion of expectation:  agents expect given outcomes to just 
the extent that those outcomes weigh in their choices. 
dabble with frequency theories of chance, you might be inclined to argue that success 
will be guaranteed once I have exhausted all the cases that contribute to the 
frequencies that fix the chances.  But this move only draws attention to a more 
fundamental objection to the long-run justification.  The question at issue is:  why is 
right to bet with the chances now, in this particular case?  It is no answer to be told 
that so betting would comprise one component in a composite possible action that 
would guarantee eventual long-run success.  What if I have no thought for the future, 
and am concerned only to make money on some bet today?  Surely I still have just as 
much reason to bet with the chances as anybody else.  [Cf. Pierce 1923: 69; Hacking 
1965: 47; Putnam 1987: 80-4.]
Readers may feel I am pushing at an open door here.  After all, isn’t is agreed on all 
sides that there is no way of justifying the chance rule in terms of something else?  
But it is not the mere unjustifiability of the chance rule to which I am currently 
concerned to draw attention.  Rather, I want to bring out how odd it is that this 
unjustifiable principle should advise us to choose one kind of action (that which 
maximizes benefit over all my possible successors), when what we really want is a 
different kind of action (that which maximizes benefit to my sole actual successor).  It 
is one thing to adopt an unjustifiable principle advising actions of kind Φ.  It is 
another thing to adopt such a principle when we don’t care about Φ at all, but only 
about something else to which Φ has no non-question-begging connection.
I find orthodox thinking close to paradoxical on this point [cf. Papineau 2003a].  It is 
striking, however, that the threat of paradox is peculiar to orthodox metaphysics, and 
does not arise within the no-collapse framework.  The puzzle for orthodoxy is to 
explain why I should maximize chance-weighted benefit over all possible successors, 
given that what I really want is benefit for my sole actual successor.  On the 
Everettian view, though, this puzzle simply disappears.  For the puzzle presupposes 
that only one of my possible successors will be actual (‘my sole actual successor’).  
But if there are no collapses, then I have no sole actual successor—rather I will be 
succeeded by all possible successors, weighted by their intensities.  So Everettians 
face no further puzzle, once they adopt the basic principle that I should act with the
intensities (the intensity rule).  If I have no unique future self, there is no need to 
explain why acting on the intensities is good for that unique future self.  Rather, 
acting with the intensities is already benefiting all my actual future selves, in 
proportion to their intensities.  
Speaking for myself, I find this a very persuasive argument in favour of the no-
collapse interpretation.  I have always found it very disturbing that there is no good 
way of justifying the chance rule.  My disquiet wasn’t just that the rule is unjustifiable.  
After all, justification has to stop somewhere.  The real worry was that this seemed 
quite the wrong place for our spade to turn.  Since the chance rule recommends that 
we perform actions with one feature (probable success) when we really desire another 
feature (actual success), it seems as if there ought to be some non-question-begging 
way of connecting the chance rule’s recommendation with what we really desire.  But 
there isn’t.
From this perspective, it is orthodoxy that has two mysteries, where Everett only has 
one.  Both start by advocating their respective rules (chance, intensity) as primitive.  
But Everettians can stop there, with one mystery.  By contrast, orthodoxy faces the 
further challenge of explaining why we should do things we don’t care about in 
pursuit of things we do—a challenge it cannot answer.
2d.  Constraints of Rationality
At the end of his section 3 Lewis says:  ‘But quantum mechanical intensity, unlike 
chance, is a recently discovered and theory-laden magnitude, unknown to all rational 
thinkers of the past and many rational thinkers of the present.  It’s not at all plausible 
that it might figure in any basic principle of rationality.’  It is not immediately clear 
what to make of this.  The chance rule and the intensity rule are both prescriptions to 
match expectations to some mind-independent feature of the world.  There is no 
obvious reason why the better of these prescriptions should always have 
recommended itself to rational thinkers.  Even so, it will be interesting to compare the 
two rules on this score.  The intensity rule will turn out to fare much better than might 
be expected.
As a first step, it will be helpful to decompose both the chance and intensity rules into 
a priori and a posteriori components.  This decomposition is familiar in connection 
with the chance rule.  The chance rule can be split into (a) an a priori specification of 
the ‘chance role’, plus (b) an a posteriori account of the ‘chancemakers’ that fill this 
role in the actual world.  The a priori component has been articulated by Lewis as the 
‘Principal Principle’:  in effect, this stipulates that chance is that quantity to which it is 
rational to proportion our expectations [Lewis 1980].  It is then a further question 
what mind-independent quantity actually fills this role.  We can imagine a similar 
decomposition of the intensity rule into a priori and a posteriori components.
Let us first compare our rules in the a priori dimension.  If there is to be an opposition 
here, we will need to build the metaphysical difference between chance and intensity 
into the stipulation of roles.  (If the a priori chance role merely stipulates that chance 
is that quantity to which rational expectations should be proportioned, then 
Everettians can simply take the reductionist line that their intensities are the actual 
realizers of this role.)  So let us accordingly build it into the stipulation of the chance 
role that chances are a measure over alternative possibilities, and correspondingly 
build it into the stipulation of the intensity role that intensities are measures over 
persistently coexisting actualities.6[6]
Now, it is undeniable that the chance role, so understood, has been more familiar to 
rational thinkers through history than the corresponding intensity role.  The intensity 
role assumes that probabilistic set-ups develop into coexisting actualities, and this is a 
recent innovation, prompted by the need to interpret quantum mechanics.  The 
associated notion of intensity is therefore no more than a few decades old.  However, 
it is not clear that chance itself does significantly better.  If intensity is a few decades 
old, chance can at best boast a few centuries.  For chance is also a ‘recently 
discovered and theory-laden magnitude’.  In The Emergence of Probability [1975] Ian 
Hacking shows that pre-seventeenth-century rational thought had no place for a 
                                                
6[6]  This articulation of metaphysical presuppositions makes it salient that our stipulations of roles need 
to be conditionalized (like all such stipulations) if they are they are to remain a priori:  the most that we 
can properly stipulate a priori is that ‘chance is that quantity, if any, which attaches to competing 
possibilities and which rational expectations should match’, and similarly for the intensity role;  it is 
then an a posteriori matter whether reality supplies anything to fit these stipulations.
concept of an objective chance-like quantity to which rational expectations should 
conform.  This may seem surprising, but doubters will do well to note that, while 
there was plenty of gambling in antiquity, and certainly enough mathematical 
sophistication to do the requisite sums, there is no evidence that anybody was able to 
analyse even the simplest games of chance.  (‘Someone with only the most modest 
knowledge of probability mathematics could have won himself the whole of Gaul in a 
week’ [Hacking 1975: 3].)
Let me now turn to the question of role-fillers.  Perhaps chance does better than 
intensity when we consider the actual quantities which fill the respective roles.  
Maybe the recommendation that we should proportion our expectations to the 
chancemakers forces itself upon rational thinkers, while the corresponding 
recommendation about ‘intensitymakers’ does not.
At first pass, though, this seems unlikely.  As so far presented, both orthodoxy and 
Everett take the relevant role-fillers to be the squared amplitudes of the branches.  
True, orthodoxy takes these to measure current standings in the competition to 
become real, whereas Everett takes them to impose a measure over the persistently 
coexisting branches.  But this metaphysical difference was already built into the 
stipulation of a priori roles, as discussed above.  So, if we put this metaphysical 
difference to one side, it seems that just the same quantity fills the roles on both 
approaches, which makes it hard to see how rational thought could regard orthodoxy’s 
role-filler as a better guide to expectations than Everett’s.
Perhaps Lewis has in mind the specific theory of chancemaking he developed in 
‘Humean Supervenience Debugged’ [1994].  There he argued that chancemakers are 
patterns of particular fact identified by the Best System.  We need not go into details:  
it is enough to know that the Best System will tend, other things being equal, to 
equate the chances of outcomes with their omnitemporal relative frequencies, and also 
to ascribe equal chances to outcomes that display physical symmetries.
This account of chancemaking is motivated by Humean considerations.  Lewis wants 
chances to supervene on matters of particular local fact:  two worlds that agree on 
such facts should not disagree on chances.  But his 1994 paper also manifests another 
motivation.  This comes out when he considers the possibility that some special 
quantity (squared amplitude, perhaps) might play the role of chancemaker.  
Humeanism by itself does not rule this out:  squared amplitudes are as much particular 
facts as masses are.  At this point Lewis appeals to considerations of rationality.  He 
says that he can ‘see, dimly but well enough’ (p. 484) how frequencies and 
symmetries can ‘constrain rational credence’, but cannot ‘begin to see’ how some 
primitive theoretical quantity could do this.
Everettians have a strong reply available at this point.  They can argue that they are 
even better placed that the Humean Lewis to explain how their probability-makers 
‘constrain rational credence’.  They can’t of course constrain credences by 
frequencies, since they think that the future will display all frequencies, including 
rogue frequencies on low intensity branches.  But Everettians can relate credences to 
physical symmetries.  Recent work, originating with David Deutsch, argues that, once 
you accept Everettian metaphysics, then the intensity rule is forced on you by the 
physical symmetries of no-collapse quantum theory.7[7]  The argument goes like this:  
assume only innocuous Everettian variants of standard decision-theoretic constraints 
on rational preferences, such as transitivity (if you prefer act 1 to act 2, and act 2 to 
act 3, then prefer act 1 to act 3) and dominance  (if act 1’s payoffs are greater than act 
2’s on all branches, then prefer act 1 to act 2);  it can then be shown that agents who 
satisfy these constraints, and act with full quantum knowledge, must always choose as
if they are maximizing expected utility with subjective degrees of belief 
corresponding to the squared amplitudes.  In effect, the symmetries of quantum theory 
plus basic rationality constraints dictate that rational agents will conform to the 
intensity rule.
There are affinities between the Deutsch approach and ‘classical probability theory’ 
which seeks to base probabilities on an assumption of equiprobability for physically 
symmetrical outcomes, such as heads and tails on a fair coin.  But this classical 
approach runs into trouble within deterministic classical physics, for there have to be 
symmetry-breaking differences in initial conditions of tossing to explain why coins 
sometimes come down heads and sometimes tails.  So, to reinstate the probabilities 
for heads and tails within deterministic classical physics, we have to impose a 
probability distribution over the initial conditions of tossing, and it is by no means 
obvious that this in turn can be derived solely from physical symmetries.
What about collapse versions of quantum mechanics?  These aren’t deterministic, so 
why can’t they appeal to the same symmetries as are used by the Everettians?  The 
trouble here is that any serious collapse theory has to add some physical principles to 
the basic Schrödinger dynamics, in order to explain how and why collapses occur.  It 
would remain to be shown that anything like the Deutsch approach can work given 
these extra physical principles.
Perhaps collapse chance theorists could take a leaf out of Lewis’s Humean book, and 
somehow use omnitemporal frequencies to show why collapse chances should 
constrain rational credence.  But I must confess I have no clear conception of how 
orthodox collapse interpretations of quantum mechanics might do this.8[8]
Let me sum up the analysis of this subsection.  We started with Lewis’s suspicion that 
intensity is unlikely to figure ‘in any basic principle of rationality’, since it is ‘a 
recently discovered and theory-laden magnitude’.  On examination, however, there 
seem no good grounds for this suspicion.  For one thing, the a priori concept of 
chance is itself a relatively recent innovation.  Moreover, insofar as basic rationality 
hinges on frequencies or symmetries, intensity would seem to have a positive 
advantage, since Deutsch’s approach allows Everettians to ground credences in 
physical symmetries, while it is unclear whether orthodox collapse theories can do 
anything similar.
More generally, let me now sum up the last three subsections’ overall analysis of the 
relative justifiability of the chance and intensity rules .  Lewis initially charged 
Everettians with positing two mysteries where orthodoxy has only one.  But in section 
                                                
7[7]  [Deutsch 1999; Wallace 2002].  See also [Saunders 2003].  I would like to thank David Wallace 
and Simon Saunders for helpful discussion of the Deutsch approach.
8[8]  Moreover, taking omnitemporal frequencies to be chancemakers generates problems of its own.  
See [Lewis 1994].
2b I showed that Everettians have no more mysteries than orthodoxy, since they can 
simply substitute the intensity rule for the chance rule, rather than adding it as an extra.  
Then in section 2c I argued that it is orthodoxy which has two mysteries, not Everett, 
since orthodoxy has to square its chance rule with our concern for our unique actual 
successors, where Everettians recognize no such unique actual successors.  Finally, in 
this subsection I have suggested that Everettians may be left with no mystery at all, 
since they can justify their intensity rule by appeal to physical symmetries and basic 
principles of rational preference, while it is unclear whether orthodoxy can do 
anything similar for its chance rule.    
Everettian metaphysics is strange and troubling, where orthodoxy seems familiar and 
comfortable.  But it seems to me that if we consider the matter without prejudice, and 
make sure we do not mistake familiarity for cogency, it is orthodoxy that is in a tangle 
with probabilities, not Everett.
3. Life-and-Death Branching
3a. Lewis on Life-and-Death Cases.
In the second half of his paper Lewis focuses on the implications of the no-collapse 
view for life-or-death situations.  These are cases where a conscious creature has 
some non-zero probability of dying.  For example, imagine you are yourself in the 
position of Schrödinger’s cat, and will die if the poison is released.
Lewis argues that in any such case an Everettian should fully expect to survive.  After 
all, the no-collapse metaphysics guarantees that there will be a future branch on which
you emerge from the box unscathed, alongside the branch where you die.  Moreover, 
since you will have no experiences on the death branch, it makes no sense for you to 
expect that branch, so you should have a 100% expectation of surviving.
Lewis generalizes, and concludes that in life-and-death cases we need to adjust the 
intensity rule, and apportion all our expectation to the branches where we survive.  
‘When we have life-and-death branching, . . . first discard all the death branches, 
because there are no minds and no experiences associated with death branches.  Only 
then divide expectations of experience between the remaining branches in proportion 
to their intensities’ (p. 00).
Lewis then considers repeated life-or-death situations.  For example, suppose that you 
are subject to a hundred repetitions of Schrödinger’s experiment, being required to re-
enter the box each time you survive it.  Orthodoxy gives you only a very low chance 
of coming out of this composite experiment alive.  But once more the no-collapse 
view seems to advise full confidence in survival:  after all, at each stage there will be 
a branch on which you survive, and your cumulative experience of such branches is 
the only experience you should expect, so you should expect it 100%.
Lewis then makes three further points about repeated life-or-death trials.  (1)  If 
Everett is right, we can all expect to live indefinitely.  For all causes of death are all 
probabilistic, and so an Everettian should expect to survive every successive threat of 
death.  (2)  If and when you do find that you have repeatedly survived death threats, 
you will have strong evidence for the no-collapse theory and against orthodoxy.  For 
orthodoxy implies that such repeated survival is highly unlikely, whereas it is just 
what you should expect on the no-collapse view.  (3)  Don’t think that the indefinite 
survival guaranteed by Everett is good news.  You may be guaranteed to survive 
indefinitely, but you should also expect to survive sans friends, sans abilities, sans
everything that makes life worth living.
Lewis does not suggest that any of this discredits the no-collapse view.  His main 
concern is not to disprove Everettian metaphysics, but to show it promises a dismal 
immortality.  ‘You who bid good riddance to collapse laws . . . should shake in your 
shoes.  Everett’s idea is elegant, but heaven forfend it should be true!  Sad to say, a 
reason to wish that it is false is no reason to believe that it is false’ (p. 00).
3b.  Why Modify the Intensity Rule?
I think Lewis’s analysis of life-or-death branching is flawed.  There is no reason to 
modify the intensity rule to deal with life-or-death cases in the first place.  And, given 
this, there is no reason for Everettians to despair about the prospect of indefinitely 
prolonged misery.
It is true that the no-collapse view implies that we will all have successors who will 
survive miserably into the indefinite future.  But this is no reason for Everettians to 
feel particularly downcast.  For Everettians can also look forward to future branches 
on which they die at a proper time, along with yet other branches where they die a few 
years too soon or too late.  Taking all these branches together, there is no reason for 
Everettians to feel any worse about the future than orthodox thinkers:  whatever your 
metaphysics, you should have an infinitesimal expectation that you will survive 
miserably for an indefinite time, and more reasonable expectations for a normal 
spectrum of timely and untimely deaths.
Of course, these last remarks assume that Everettians can follow orthodoxy in having 
normal expectations about futures in which they are dead.  And this is precisely what 
Lewis’s ‘modified intensity rule’ denies.  In normal non-life-or-death cases, 
Everettian expectations quantitatively match those of orthodoxy, despite the 
divergence in underlying metaphysics.  But when it is matter of life-or-death, says 
Lewis, expectations should come out quite differently, with Everettians distributing 
the totality of their expectations over those futures where they survive, and 
discounting altogether futures where they perish.
Still, it is by no means obvious why Everettians should modify their intensity rule in 
this way.  For it seems perfectly open for them to apply the unmodified intensity rule 
in life-or-death situations, just as elsewhere.  If they do this, then they can expect all 
futures in proportion to their intensities, whether or not those futures contain any of 
their live successors.  For example, even when you know you are about to be the 
subject in a fifty-fifty Schrödinger’s experiment, you should expect a future branch 
where you perish, to just the same degree as you expect a future branch where you 
survive.
To bring out the oddity of modifying the intensity rule in the way Lewis suggests, 
consider the implications for rational action.  Rational agents will maximize benefit 
over all future possibilities weighted by the degree to which they expect those 
possibilities.  So, if you have a 50% expectation that you will die in Schrödinger’s 
experiment, and regard dying as a very bad thing, then you will have a strong reason 
not to participate in the experiment.  But someone whose expectations are governed 
by the modified intensity rule will attach a zero expectation to this death branch, and 
so will not regard the danger of death as any reason to avoid the experiment.  More 
generally, rational agents whose expectations are guided by the modified intensity 
rule will happily embrace any threat of death, for their only expectation will be of 
survival.9[9]
Why exactly does Lewis think that Everettians should modify their intensity rule in 
the face of life-or-death situations?  It is not clear.  He does consider the alternative of 
keeping the uncorrected intensity rule to govern expectations ‘not of experience but of 
what will happen whether experienced or not’.  His response is simply ‘But this is not 
really the intensity rule, which governed only expectations of experience’ (footnote 
23).
However, this just moves the question around.  Why start off in by formulating the 
intensity rule in terms of ‘expectations of experience’ in the first place , rather than in  
terms of ‘what will happen whether experienced or not’?  When Lewis first introduces 
the intensity rule, in section 3, it is in the context of theoretical confirmation.  
Everettians need probabilities so that they can make probabilistic theoretical 
predictions which might be confirmed or disconfirmed by later experience.  As Lewis 
puts it ‘. . . we need some new way for no-collapse quantum mechanics to advise us 
what to expect’ (p. 00, my italics).  Now, it is true that, as far as theoretical 
confirmation goes, it is only expectations of experience that matter, for the simple 
reason that it is only when some such expectation is confirmed or disconfirmed by 
actual experience that we will get a shift in confirmation.  But this is no good reason 
to formulate the intensity rule in terms of ‘expectations of experience’, rather than 
‘expectations of what will happen whether experienced or not’.  For ‘expectations of 
experience’ are all special cases of ‘expectations of what will happen whether 
experienced or not’, and so an intensity rule formulated in the latter terms will still 
provide everything we need for purposes of theoretical confirmation.
We can put the point like this.  Theoretical confirmation is one purpose for which we 
need expectations.  And for this purpose expectations of experience are all we need.  
But we also need expectations to guide our rational choices, and here an intensity rule 
formulated solely in terms of expectations of experience will lead us astray.  In 
particular, such an intensity rule will stop us attaching expectations to branches in 
which we will have no experience, and so will fail to persuade us to avoid dangers of 
death.10[10]
3c  There is No Such Thing as a Free Confirmation.
                                                
9[9]  Though Lewis himself does not highlight this death-defying consequence of the modified intensity 
rule, he does refer approvingly to Peter J. Lewis [2000], who focuses on precisely this implication.  
Note also that David Lewis suggests that, to the extent that you already believe Everett, you will be 
relatively unworried about risking death in order to further confirm the theory (p. 00). 
10[10]  See [Papineau 2003b] for a critical discussion of some other possible motivations for modifying 
the intensity rule.
If the intensity rule remains unmodified in life-or-death situations, then Everettians 
will not be able to confirm their theory in the easy way that Lewis envisages.  Lewis’s 
suggestion was that Everettians can confirm their theory simply by repeatedly 
subjecting themselves to dangers of death and noting that they survive every time.  
But without the modified intensity rule this doesn’t work.  Those Everettians who do 
eventually find that they have survived repeated dangers of death11[11] will no longer 
be able to regard their survival as confirming their no-collapse theory.  For a no-
collapse theory with an unmodified intensity rule will no longer predict that repeated 
survival is particularly likely, and so the observation of such repeated survival will 
add no credence to that theory.  
Some readers may be wondering whether Everettians need to modify their intensity 
rule in order to engineer themselves a free confirmation.  Let me conclude my 
analysis by briefly addressing this issue, as it brings out an interesting aspect of the 
Everett interpretation.  Consider the proposition that, after some repeated life-or-death 
trial, the future will contain a branch on which I survive.  Even with an unmodified 
intensity rule, this existential proposition is guaranteed to be true by Everett, but very 
unlikely given orthodoxy.  The branch where I survive may have a low intensity 
compared with the death branches, but Everett still implies with certainty that this 
branch will exist, where orthodoxy by no means does so.  So, when my survivor does 
find himself in the future, and observes something which Everett says is certain but 
orthodoxy say is unlikely, it might seem that this by itself will constitute evidence 
favouring Everett over orthodoxy.
Indeed there is nothing in this reasoning that hinges on death risks, repeated or 
otherwise.  Consider the simple toss of a quantum coin.  Everett guarantees that the 
future will contain a branch with Heads, whereas orthodoxy says this is only 50% 
probable.  So when one of my successors finds that the future does indeed contain 
Heads, this alone would seem to confirm Everett.  (Moreover, this reasoning would 
seem equally available to my successor who sees Tails.)
There is a flaw in this line of reasoning, however.  When you adjust your credence in 
some theory in the light of new evidence, it is essential that you take into account all
your new evidence.  Otherwise you can boost the confirmation of the theory simply 
by focusing on positive evidence and ignoring other evidence.  And that is precisely 
what is going on here.  For when I discover that the future contains a survivor of mine, 
or that it contains a Heads result, this isn’t all I discover.  In addition I learn that I am 
the survivor, or that I have observed Heads.  This was by no means guaranteed.  It 
was very unlikely that I would survive, rather than end up on a death branch, and it 
was only 50% likely that I would see Heads.  So if we take into account everything 
that I learn, including these egocentric facts about which branch I am now on, then the 
no-collapse theory ascribes just the same probability to these facts as orthodoxy, and 
so receives no greater confirmation when they are observed.
It is true that, from an orthodox point of view, egocentric propositions like I am alive, 
or I see Heads, are unusual propositions to be the primary bearers of probabilities.12[12]  
                                                
11[11]   Of course, without the modified rule, Everettians will now have good reason to avoid such 
dangers.  However, not all dangers can be avoided.
12[12]  Orthodoxy does have some room for egocentric probabilities.  If I believe that there is an 
objective chance of p% that I will be transported to Manchester in my sleep, then orthodoxy will advise 
But note that probabilities for such egocentric propositions were built into the no-
collapse theory from the start.  If I am an Everettian, and envisage opening 
Schrödinger’s box, I have no uncertainty about the impersonal structure of the future.  
I know for sure that it will contain a successor of David Papineau who sees a live cat, 
and one who sees a dead cat.  All I am unsure about is what I will see.  Admittedly, 
Everettians have work to do to articulate the structure of these egocentric probability 
spaces, and to explain the associated metaphysics of splitting selves.13[13]  Still, given 
that egocentric probabilities were always at the heart of the no-collapse theory, there 
seems nothing ad hoc about appealing to these egocentric probabilities in order to get 
the confirmation relations right.
To sum up, there is no quick route to the confirmation of the no-collapse theory, 
whichever way we turn the intensity rule.  However, Everettians need not feel 
disappointed that these invitations to free confirmation have been withdrawn.  As we 
have seen, anybody who accepted these invitations would end up committed to 
fallacious reasoning.  In any case, Everttians have no need of confirmational charity.  
They have support enough in the two considerations that originally motivated the no-
collapse theory.  The first motivation lies in the theory’s direct experimental support:  
in all circumstances simple enough for the interference effects that demonstrate non-
collapse to be detected (like the two-slit experiment) such interference is indeed 
observed.  The second motivation is the inferiority of the theoretical alternatives:  all 
the ad hoc accounts which nevertheless posit collapses (under conditions too complex 
to test for interference effects) are not only strikingly less elegant than Everett, but 
also require the rejection of special relativity and the conservation of energy.
As far as empirical confirmation goes, then, the no-collapse theory is as healthy as 
could be.  The experimental evidence leaves no room for anything except highly ad 
hoc alternatives.  If there is reason to resist the no-collapse theory, it can only be that 
it does not make proper sense, that it somehow undercuts itself by assuming concepts 
to which it is not entitled.  I hope that this paper has at least shown that there is no 
reason why Everettians are not entitled to the concept of probability.   
* * *
Many people have been lessened by David Lewis’s early death.  The philosophical 
community in particular has lost one of its guiding lights.  Those who attach credence 
to the no-collapse theory may find some consolation in the thought that there are 
survivors of the David Lewis that we knew on other branches of reality.  These 
survivors will not all be thriving, as Lewis himself stressed in his lecture.  But some 
of them, perhaps the preponderance, will be in good health and continuing to spread 
philosophical enlightenment.  Still, even for Everettians, such thoughts will provide 
no more than consolation.  If there are other branches of reality, they are permanently 
                                                                                                                                           
me to attach a credence of p% to I am in Manchester when I wake up and have no other information.  
Note, however, that that this egocentric proposition stands or falls with the non-egocentric proposition 
David Papineau is in Manchester.  The Everett interpretation is different in requiring egocentric 
probabilities that cannot be so reduced to non-egocentric ones.  (Some would argue that even 
orthodoxy sometimes requires irreducibly egocentric probabilities, as for instance in the ‘Sleeping 
Beauty’ puzzle [Elga 2000; Lewis 2001; Arntzenius 2002; Monton 2002].  However, the analysis of 
this puzzle is by no means clear-cut.) 
13[13] For a start, see [Saunders 1998], especially section 4.3.
inaccessible to us.  David Lewis has been lost to our section of history, and we are the 
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